Mr. Leader, it is good to have you back, as

always, to see you continuing to make such substantial contributions to our Nation.

I am interpreting you as concluding that the U.N. resolution is

a delayed tactic, and that we would probably not get the resolution,

and you have therefore concluded that the United States should be prepared to act unilaterally.

Kosovo is not a household word. There would have to be, I think,

substantial moral leadership to bring the Nation to understand

why we were doing this. In a moment, I would like you to just comment on my general observations.

In a meeting that occurred earlier in the week regarding this

subject I raised the question, as the world’s only superpower, more

and more it seems to me we are confronted with, but in the end

we will have to go it alone, and there are limits. We are paying a

price for that kind of commitment, and the ability to maintain a

force that has sufficient resources to be trained and sufficient resources

to have the ultimate in research. These resources are being

diluted, because of ongoing commitments that we have made as a Nation.

It seems to me somewhere along the way we need to step back

and say what kind of criteria will govern globally in these kinds

of decisions. We can point to five or six places on the map at any

time where there is true tragedy occurring that you could argue requires

intervention and, as I said, there are limits.

I think the limits ought to be broader than just cultural. We

have great cultural relationship with Europe, and I would be interested

in any thought that you have given to this broader question.

I do not take exception with your frankly very emotional statement

that you made. I do not know how anybody could not

empathize with it. But I do think this discussion requires that we

step back and think through the extent and breadth of what we

can do in these kinds of situations, and I know you have given this

some thought, and I would like to have your observations.

Mr. Ambassador, we all apologize. This is

out of our control, and I did not hear the conclusion of your testimony.

I wonder if you might sort of summarize that, and then

while we have a few moments, if there are other thoughts you

would like to contribute while we wait for Members to return.

Well, yours, as Senator Dole’s, is very

thought-provoking. Expand on the coalition Government concept,

and let me just say from my limited time there, which is now some

2 years, that you could already sense an intractability on both

sides, and that is why I am coming to your point about the coalition Government and wondering—

If these negotiations, pressures that you

speak of do not work, and there is certainly a high probability that

they would not, would you share your observations on how we

interact with Europe? That is saying yes, NATO should act, but

only with a Security Council resolution, Europe in general, and

then that being impractical, the role of the United States in a unilateral force.

I am going to turn to our Ranking Member

in just a moment, but we are in an interesting time warp. We have

now voted on another resolution expressing frustration, I believe,

in our country and in the Congress that is beginning to surface

about the sharing of responsibilities in Bosnia in general, and I

think those motions, at least at the moment, really the activists are

disconnected from their effect on this, but we now had two, just

during the course of this hearing.

It strikes me that, with the nature of the terrain and geography,

that a forced decision has to accept substantial collateral casualties.

Obviously, we cannot be unmindful of that. Do you have any comment?

Do you believe, if that kind of course is exercised

on Milosevic, given where we are and the dawdling policy

you describe, that we can convince the Albanians equally that the

violence must stop, or are they at a point, emotion-driven and the

like, where they feel they have more to gain by continuing? Senator Biden.

The observations have been directly on

Kosovo, the Serbians, and Milosevic. Do you have any observations

as to how we might be more effective in sharing with our European

allies the very concern that you have?

It would strike me they, among all, would be more committed to

this than you or we, and yet the reticence is obvious and apparent.

I appreciate the observation. I thank the

chair for allowing me to intervene with a final question.